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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

ELWOOD K. McFARLAND,

)

Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 18352
vs.

)

SKAGGS, INC.,

)

Defendant/Appellant.

)
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a jury verdict and
judgment in favor of Respondent in a case of false
arrest.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
A jury in the Second Judicial District Court
for Weber County, the Honorable RONALD O. HYDE, judge
presiding, returned a verdict in favor of Respondent
for false arrest in the amount of $10,000.00 general
damages and $25,000.00 punitive damages.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests this Court to uphold the
jury verdict and judgment below and dismiss this appeal.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
With the exception of the first paragraph, the
Statement of Facts presented by Appellant is totally irrelevant.

The cardinal rule of appellate procedure is that

the party prevailing below is entitled to have facts and
evidence reviewed by this Court in the light most favorable
to the jury's verdict.

Hutchison v. Gleave, 632 P.2d 815

(Utah 1981); Cintron v. Milkovich, 611 P.2d 730 (Utah 1980);
Gassner v. Dairyman Associates, Inc., 611 P.2d 713 (Utah
1980); Ute-Cal Land Development Corporation v. Sather, 605
P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980).

The facts, as testified to at the

trial by Respondent, are as follows:
On January 9, 1980, at about 5:30 P.M., ELWOOD K.
McFARLAND, Respondent, entered a Skaggs Drug Store in Ogden,
Utah, for the purpose of purchasing a T.V. antenna plug, as
he had been requested to do by his wife.

(Record p.6.)

Respondent was familiar with the Skaggs store and had
shopped there frequently, as it was very close to his
dentistry office.

After checking the two store racks where

he expected the part to be, Respondent, after not finding
the part, left the store.

A few steps outside the exit,

Respondent was accosted by ANITA AVONDET.

Avondet was not

wearing any identifying badges or clothing which would in
any way denote that she was a security officer for the
Skaggs store.

(R. 15, 18, and 130-131.)

Further, Avondet
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did not identify herself as a security officer.

(R. 15.)

She merely stated to Respondent, "Sir, I want to talk to
you. "

(R.

16.)

Respondent, unaware of Ms. Avondet's status as a
security guard or any reason for her concern, attempted to
step past Avondet and extended his arm to brush her away thinking she was trying to sell him something.

(R. 16.)

At

that time a scuffle ensued with Avondet forcibly grabbing
Respondent by both lapels.

(R. 14.)

At some point during the scuffle, while Respondent
was attempting to release Ms. Avondet's unwarranted grasp of
his lapels, Respondent suddenly realized that Avondet was
·not just some kook trying to sell him books or flowers
since these kooks don't usually fight you for your money.
(R. 44.)

Respondent indicated to Avondet that he understood

what she wanted, but she was making a big mistake.

(R.

20.)

Avondet responded that she wasn't paid "to make
mistakes."

(R. 20.)

Accordingly, Respondent ceased

scuffling and accompanied Avondet back through the store,
under the humiliating gazes of store employees and customers,
and up to the security office.
After Respondent was seated in the office, Avondet
called the police and reported a "shoplifting case."

(R.

20.)

Avondet then asked Respondent to "take whatever you've taken
from that pocket right there" while pointing to Respondent's
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right-hand raincoat pocket.

Respondent thereupon

(R. 20.)

(R. 23.)

produced his car kets from the pocket.

Avondet

made no further search of Respondent, though Respondent
specifically asked her if she wanted to.

(R. 24.)

Other

store personnel searched along Respondent's route out of
the store and in the area of the scuffle but failed to find
any stolen.merchandise.

(This is obviously because

Respondent had not stolen anything.)
Ogden City police officers arrived.

Sometime later two
During a conversation

between Avondet and one of the police officers in a hallway,
Respondent overheard, for the first time, the police officer
mention assault, after only hearing Avondet's side of the
story.

(R. 28-29.)
After the discussion in the hall between Avondet

and the officer, Respondent was told by the officer he was
free to go.

(R. 31.)

Respondent was never formally charged

with any crime as a result of this incident, nor was
Respondent ever brought before a magistrate.

After being

released, Respondent was again forced to make the embarrassing walk out of the Skaggs store, under the gaze of
employees and customers.
Respondent instituted this lawsuit against Skaggs,
seeking $10,000.00 in general damages and $50,000.00 in
punitive damages.

At trial, while discussing the various

requested instructions, it became apparent for the first
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time that Appellant was going to attempt to justify the
arrest, claiming it was predicated on an assault.

The trial

court warned Appellant's counsel that the law, as the judge
understood it, provided no probable cause privilege for such
an arrest by a private citizen.

(R. 197.)

Appellant, none-

theless, proceeded to adduce "assault" testimony and argue
this purported defense to the jury.

Respondent requested

and received leave to submit supplemental jury instructions
concerning assault, which became the court's Instructions 11
and 12.
Based on the testimony, instruction, and argument,
the jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondent in the
amount of $10,000.00 general damages and $25,000.00 punitive
damages.

The trial court denied Appellant's Motion for a

New Trial, and this appeal resulted.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the trial court's instruction that

there was no probable cause privilege for a private arrest
for assault accurately reflects the law of Utah.
2.

Whether the trial court was correct in denying

Respondent's motion that any assault arrest privilege had
been lost by failure to bring Respondent before a magistrate.
3.

Whether the trial court's instruction requiring

Appellant to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that an
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assault had been "committed" accurately reflects the law
of Utah.
4.

Whether the rule of stare decisis is to be

totally ignored and this Court reverse Terrv v. ZCMI, 605
P.2d 314

(Utah 1979).
A R G U ME N T
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS
ACCURATELY REFLECTED UTAH LAN.
A.
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING
MERCHANTS' PRIVILEGES IN SHOPLIFTING
CASES PROPERLY STATED UTAH LAW.
Given the organization of Appellant's Brief, it

is difficult to determine whether or not Appellant is still
maintaining that the trial court's instructions concerning
merchants' privileges in shoplifting cases were proper.

It

makes little difference whether Appellant is so arguing or
not.

Even a cursory reading of the instructions shows

their adequacy.
First, it is incorrect to state that Section
78-11-17, Utah Code Annotated, does not reauire a "reason
to believe."

(Brief of Appellant, p.8.)

statute contains those precise words.

In fact, the

Thus, the trial

court's Instruction No. 7, which clearly lays out the
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requirements of reasonable belief, adequately summarizes the
merchant's privilege.

The other instructions requested by

Skaggs would therefore have been merely improperly cumulative.

See e.g. 75 Am. Jur. 2d 597, Trials, Sec. 630.

Further, Appellant has not even attempted to make a cursory
showing that any imagined impropriety in the instructions
had any effect whatsoever on the jury in their deliberations.
B.
THERE IS NO PRIVATE PROBABLE
CAUSE PRIVILEGE IN UTAH TO
ARREST FOR ASSAULT.
The circumstances under which a orivate person is
privileged to arrest another in the State of Utah are stated
very clearly in one single sentence.

Section 77-7-3 states:

A private person may arrest another for a
public offense committed or attempted in
his presence.
(Formerly Section 77-13-4)
No matter how many times one reads the above statute, the
words "probable cause" fail to appear.

Despite this obvi-

ously intentional legislative omission - and certainly no
one contends that the Legislature could not have created
such a privilege if it wanted (see e.g. 77-7-2,

formerly

77-13-3) - Appellant maintains that a "fair reading"
requires this Court to insert "probable cause" into the
statute.
This would not only be unfair; it would also be
judicial

activi~~

of its worst kind.

The statute plainly

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

requires the offense to have been "committed;" and in the
ordinary English language, "committed" requires that the
act or offense to have actually occurred.
Simply put, a private person - even a store
security officer - is not a policeman and not entitled to
the same privileges and protections.

If Ms. Avondet wants

to arrest someone for the crime of assault, she had better
be right.

She wasn't.

As the American Law Institute

states in the Restatement of the Law, Torts, Second,
Section 119, Comment 0:
If, in fact, no breach of the peace [the
crime of assault in this case] has been
committed, a mistaken belief on the part
of the actor that a breach of the peace
[assault) has been committed by the other
does not confer a privilege to arrest
under clause (c).
Thus, for a private
person to claim a privilege to arrest, it
must be shown that the crime was actually
committed.
(Emphasis added.)
Other authorities are unanimous in support of
this rule.

In 32 Am. Jur. 2d 166, False Imprisonment, Sec-

tion 97, it is stated:
It follows that liability for false arrest
or imprisonment may arise when a private
individual or a peace officer makes an
arrest for a misdemeanor and the offense
complained of was actually not committed,
even though such arrest is made on reasonable grounds and in good faith.
(Footnotes omitted, Emphasis added.)
Note that this section even imposes liability on police
officers for a mistake concerning arrests for misdemeanors
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committed in their presence.

The privilege sought by

Appellant would afford security officers greater protection
than police officers; a clearly nonsensical result.
also Prosser, Torts, Sec. 26

See

(4th ed. 1971).

With all due respect to the various bits of obiter
dicta cited by Appellant, the law in Utah, which was properly
reflected by the court's instruction, is that there is no
private privilege to arrest in a case such as this one,
based on probable cause.
Another fact illustrating this point is that such
a probable cause privilege would have made the various shoplifting statutes totally unnecessary.

The whole purpose of

these statutes is to protect the merchants by granting them
a privilege that they did not have under common nor statutory law.

c.
THERE WAS NO "IMMINENT ASSAULT"
PRIVILEGE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
Appellant's second attempt to excuse the assault
arrest is based on a theory of self-defense.

The privilege

it claims, as stated in the Restatement of Torts, Second,
Sec. 67, is as follows:
The actor is privileged intentionally to
confine another ... for the purpose of
preventing him from inflicting a harmful
or offensive contact or other bodily harm
upon the actor ....
(Emphasis added.)
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The difficulty with attempting to apply the "ore.t,;

vention of imminent assault" privilege to the instant case
is that the facts simply don't support the purpose of the
privilege.

It is crystal clear that Avondet initially

intended to arrest Respondent for shoplifting.

(R.

95.)

As defined by the Utah Code, Section 77-7-1 (formerly
77-13-2), that arrest was completed when Ms. Avondet
restrained Respondent by grabbing his lapels.

Indeed, even

if Avondet's testimony is to be believed, the first time
she indicated it was an assault arrest was upstairs in the
manager's office.

Thus, the purpose and policy, i.e., self-

defense, is not served in the least by this contrived
assault "arrest."
It is laughable to contend that a person seriously
bent on committing an assault would be in any way deterred
by the· pronunciamento:

"You're under arrest."

Indeed, all

of the cases and authorities cited by Appellant rely
heavily on the policy of prevention to justify the arrest.
See Collyer v. S. H. Kress & Company, 54 P.2d 20, 23
(Cal. 1936) - "about to injure defendant;" Fanier v.
Chesapeake and Patomac Telephone Co. of Maryland, 404 A.2d
147, 153 (D.C. 1979) - "protection of his person;" Restatement of Torts, Section 141, Afray - "participating or about
to participate in the afray."
Privileges are, and should be, applicable only
when the policy behind them is served by their application.
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In the instant case trre policy behind the privilege of private arrest for "imminent assault," i.e., self-defense,
would in no way be served.

Avondet's secret intention to

arrest for assault - and it was so secret that she didn't
reveal it until everyone was calmly seated in the office was in no way related to her self-defense.

It was instead,

as the jury obviously found, merely a trumped-up allegation
created solely in the attempt to insulate a bad shoplifting
arrest.
Moreover, as shown by the testimony of Respondent,
which should be accepted by this Court on review, the contrived assault arrest was created ex post facto.

That is,

Respondent was never informed of this purported justification during his confinement.

It was obviously created some-

time subsequent in a futile attempt to confuse the jury.
Fortunately, it did not succeed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DIRECTING
A VERDICT, AS REQUESTED BY RESPONDENT
ON THE ASSAULT ARREST.
In chambers, after conclusion of the testimony,
Respondent moved the trial court for a directed verdict of
false imprisonment on the assault arrest, on the grounds
that Appellant failed to charge Respondent within a reasonable period of time.

(R. 192.)

The court denied the motion
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on the grounds that this was merely a "transitory" arrest.
(R. 193.)

The court also refused to give Respondent's

requested supplemental instruction No. ____ (R. 367),
stating the requirement that Respondent must have been
brought before a magistrate or else any arrest privilege
was lost.
The general law across the United States is that
a private person making an arrest must bring the arrested
person before a magistrate within a reasonable period of
time after the arrest.

There is no dispute in the instant

case that such delivery did not occur.

In fact, though it

was never charged, it is clear that Avondet committed a
Class B Misdemeanor by such failure.

As stated in Section

77-13-17 (renumbered in the 1981 revision as Section
77-7-23):
When an arrest is made without a warrant
by a peace officer or private person, the
person arrested shall, without unneces--~
sary delay, be taken to the magistrate in
the precinct of the county or municipality
in which the offenses occurred, and an
information, stating the charge against
the person, shall be made before the
magistrate.
*** Any officer or person
violating any of the provisions of this
section shall be guilty of a Class B
Misdemeanor.
(Emphasis added.)
The policy behind this statute is not difficult
to determine.

Simply put, an arrested person must be

brought before a magistrate quickly in order to insure that
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normal procedures of the criminal law are complied with.
That manifestly did not occur in this case.
Accordingly, the court erred in not directing a
verdict on the contrived assault charge, as any privilege of
arrest was clearly abused and lost by the failure to bring
Respondent before a magistrate.

See Harper & James, Torts,

Sec. 3.17 at 274 (1956) and Prosser, Torts, Section 25 at
130-131 (4th ed. 1971).

The court further erred in refusing

to give Respondent's requested supplemental instruction
(R. 367.).

The instruction is clearly mandated by

the law and was drawn, verbatim, from Instruction No. 21:19,
Colorado Jury Instructions, Civil.

Even without a directed

verdict on the assault issue, the jury, with this instruction, would have had to return a verdict for Respondent
regarding the assault.

Either a directed verdict or

Respondent's requested instruction would have mooted all
of Appellant's arguments on the assault issue.
POINT III
THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD FOR
THE ASSAULT WAS CORRECT.
It should be noted that this Court not reach the
"reasonable doubt" issue for two reasons.

First, Respondent's

testimony shows that the alleged assault arrest was merely
a fiction created for the trial by Ms. Avondet.

Respondent,

according to his testimony, was never informed of any such
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arrest.

Second, as shown in Point II, supra, the trial

court should have directed the verdict on the assault charge
for failure to bring Respondent before a magistrate as
required by Utah law.
Even should this Court reach the propriety of the
"reasonable doubt" instruction, the trial court was clearly
correct.

As shown above, Point II-B, suora, there is no

private privilege to arrest unless the "crime" was actually
"committed."

It seems impossible to determine whether a

"crime" was "committed" without using criminal standards,
wh ic h is precise 1 y wh at t h e tria 1 court require d . 11
o

O

o

I

I

Despite the ineluctable logic of the above sylogisrn, Appellant seeks to muddy the waters by citing - out
of context - several ancient and inapposite authorities.
In each of these authorities, the question at issue was
whether a tort or some other action, which has some elements
parallel to a crime, must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.

The obvious, and correct, answer is that it need

not be.
Such is not the case here.

In this case Appellant

seeks to invoke a statutory privilege to arrest for the
commission of an actual crime - not a parallel tort.

This

is totally different from Avondet asserting that she

l,' This is obviously the precise reason that Section
77-13-17 required the bringing before a magistrate viz to set the criminal procedure in motion for an
ultimate judicial determination of criminality.
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"arrested" Respondent in self-defense to protect herself
from an attempted assault.

(As shown above, Point II-C,

supra, such a self-defense privilege to prevent "imminent
assault" is also inapplicable here.)
If Avondet had defended on the grounds of selfdefense, the only standard of proof required would have
been a preponderance.

Instead, Appellant attempted to

invoke a statutory protection, and must .therefore comply
with its requirements.

As stated in Prosser, Torts, Sec.

2 6 (4th Ed. 19 71) :
The private person may arrest if a felony
has in fact been committed, and he has
reasonable grounds to suspect the man
whom he arrests, but his authority depends
on the fact of the crime, and he must take
the full risk that none has been committed.

* * *
It has even been held that the felony
which has occurred must be the very one
for which he purports to make the arrest.
(Citation_s omitted, Emphasis added.)
Obviously, the protections afforded a private person for a
mere misdemeanor or breach of the peace are less than these
for a felony.
In summary, a private arrest for a crime is only
privileged if the crime actually was committed.

The only

way to determine commission is by the criminal standard, and
since Avondet herself frustrated that determination - and
committed a Class B Misdemeanor while doing so - she should
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not be allowed to profit from such action.

The only way

for this jury to decide whether a crime had, in fact, been
2/
committed was to test the case by the criminal standards.-

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT, FOLLOWING THE RULE
OF STARE DECISIS, PROPERLY APPLIED
THE TERRY STANDARD OF IMPLIED MALICE.
Respondent feels constrained to point out that
Appellant's Point III is not so much an attack on the
decision in Terry v. ZCMI, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), as an
attack on the very foundation of the Anglo-American judicial system the rule of stare decisis.

Appellant's blatant attempt to

undermine this rule goes so far as to point out the change
in membership in this court since Terry.
This desperate attempt to throw the baby out with
the bath water forgets what this Court surely will not.
This Court is not the sum of its members nor its members
individually.

It is a continuing, co-equal branch of

government charged with interpreting the laws of the State
of Utah.

The lower courts in Utah, as required by our

system of justice, look to it for guidance and follow its
decisions.

This is how it should be.
Since this Court decided Terry, the Utah Legisla-

ture has met twice in Budget Session, once in General

Y

It goes almost without saying that the police officer's testimony concerning the "assault" is without
any weight.
His opinion was formed after talking to
only one party to the event and hearing her selfserving story.
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Session, and several times in Special Session.

Despite

these ample opportunities, the Legislature has never modified this Court's ruling in Terry concerning malice, though
it certainly had the power to do so.

This continuing

acquiescence affixes the legislative imprimatur on this
Court's decision and also mandates the required procedure
for its change - i.e., legislation.

Black Bull, Inc., v.

Industrial Commission, 547 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1976).
Aside from the foregoing, Terry

~

correctly

decided, notwithstanding Professor Boyce's "Thumbnail
Sketch" and a student "Development," for all the reasons
cited in the Court's opinion.

These reasons need not be

reiterated here, as they are more eloquently stated in this
Court's own opinion.
There is no dispute that the trial court properly
applied the Terry rule in making its instruction concerning
punitive damages.

The instruction, No. 14 (R. 377), was

basically JIFU 90.76 with changes showing implied malice in
law and enumerating those factors which the jury could consider in determining the amount of punitive damages.
Even should this Court decide to overrule Terry,
it should do so prospectively, leaving the verdict here
intact.

There is ample precedent for such an action, and

the United States Supreme Court has recently furnished guidelines for determining to grant prospective application.
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In

Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Company,

U.S.

- -,

50 Law Week 4892, 4902

(Nos. 150 &

546, June 28, 1982), holding the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 in
conflict with Article III of the Constitution, the Court
stated:
Our decision in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,
404 u. S. 97 (1971), sets forth the three
considerations recognized by our precedents as properly bearing upon the issue
of retroactivity.
They are, first, whether the holding in question 'decid[ed] an
issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed' by
earlier cases, id., at 106; second,
•whether retrospective operation will
further or retard (the] operation• of the
holding in question, id., at 107; and
third, whether retroactive application
•could produce substantial inequitable
results' in individual cases, ibid.
In the instant case, as in Northern Pipeline, all
three tests militate against retroactive application.
Clearly, there have been no augeries foreshadowing this
Court overruling its own recent Terry decision.

Neither

would retroactivity aid in the application of such a new
holding.

Finally, retroactivity would be extremely in-

equitable requiring a re-trial with all its attendant pain,
delay, and cost.
The trial court, counsel, and the jury followed
...

the directives of this Court as well as humanly possible.
It would be unfair and unjust to change the rules of the
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game after it is over.

Stare decisis should hold, Terry

should be followed, and this appeal dismissed.
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N
Appellant tried to cover up a bad shoplifting
arrest with a contrived assault arrest.

The jury did not

fall for it, and now, on appeal, Appellant asserts several
alleged "errors" on behalf of the trial court in an attempt
to have this Court do for it what the jury refused to do.
The trial court did not err in instructing the
jury that there is no private probable cause arrest privilege for assault.

The unambiguous language of the statute

simply doesn't create such a privilege.
Further, the facts don't support an arrest for
the prevention of "imminent assault."

The bad shoplifting

arrest was already completed, and the policy of self-defense
was in no way served by Avondet's secret intentions.
The trial court did err in not directing a verdict
for Respondent on the grounds that, even assuming arguendo
an assault arrest privilege existed, Appellant's criminal
failure to bring Respondent before a magistrate waived any
privilege.

This ruling would have mooted the first two

issues and resolved the confusion created by Appellant's
cover-up.
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Finally, Respondent, the trial court, and the
jury are entitled, under stare decisis, to rely on the continuing vitality of this Court's holdings.

The rule of

Terry was properly applied, and the verdict should be
upheld.
This appeal should be dismissed and Respondent
given final relief and vindication from the ordeal he
suffered at the hands of Appellant.
DATED this

day of September, 1982.

FINDLEY P. GRIDLEY

BRUCE R. BAIRD
(Attorneys for Respondent)
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BRUCE R. BAIRD, ESQ.
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